Gwadar's strategic importance Par Detre



T is not the commercial importance of Gwadar harbour and the veritable economic bonanza associated with its construction on the

confluence of Central Asia, South Asia and West Asia alone, but also its location in a egion of immense geopolitical importance hat has attracted China to invest in it in a ig way

Gwadar is strategically located on the estern end of Balochistan coast, on the pposite end of the Gulf of Oman and the traits of Hormuz and on the mouth of the ulf. It lies just 624 nautical kms to the east Straits of Hormuz, which is an important ute for oil tankers bound for Japan and estern countries out of Gulf. It is 460km ay from Karachi in the east and 120km tay from Iranian border in the west

When the deep-sea port becomes functionvaious plans for important cross-national pipelines passing through the province ould further enhance the region's strategic lue. Chinese financial assistance and tech-

al expertise would instrumental oughout the course

development of vadar port. The 10 million package this port is the gest ever offered any country by na.

Gwadar port is fortant for China n both economic security point of w. It will be linking western province

Xinjiang with ikistan. It is expectd to become a gatevay port for Central Asia and Xingjiang.

The United States considers Chinese presence in Gwadar a threat to its fleet in the Gulf and also to the crucially important chokepoint for the strategic oil trade to the Far East and Europe. Besides, the US military bases in the Gulf expect an interception threat to their communications by the Chinese from Gwadar. It is worth mentioning here that the US has often viewed the growth of Sino-Pakistan strategic ties with suspicion.

America and China have been, in a sense, in a state of cold war since the collapse of the former Soviet Union. After the Sino-Soviet strategic consensus, the US has been unhappy over the rapidly growing power and influence of China in Asia.

America's strategic advance into Afghanistan and then Iraq and stationing of US troops in Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Iraq, it is believed, are also aimed at containing China in Central Asia and the Gulf.

Conventional thinking about a possible confrontation between the US and China assumes that the geography of conflict will be off China's coast. In his book, "The New Great Game-Blood & Oil in Central Asia" the veteran war correspondent Lutz Kleveman makes an intriguing argument loaned to western regions including

By Syed Fazl-e-Haider

that the primary challenge to US power in the region will in fact come from China's hinterland province of Xingjiang over the resources of the energy-rich Caspian Sea and the surrounding Central Asian republics.

Kleveman contends that the "New Great Game" players are Russia, the United States, China, Iran, India and Pakistan. The prize this time is control of the oil and gas reserves and the pipelines that will transport the product to the market. The various endpoints for these pipelines include Turkey, Russia, Iran, Pakistan, and China. The vital sea-lanes, particularly for shipping oil from the region to the outside world, pass by Gwadar. In fact, it would be the terminus of gas pipelines reaching from Daulatabad's fields in Turkmenistan or Pars fields in Iran.

Internally, China perceives a security threat from the separatist tendencies witnessed among dominant Uighur Muslim population in Xingjiang. Beijing is in fact working on a strategy, as part of its appeasement

Xingiiang for infrastructure development.

China recently signed a contract with neighbouring Tajikistan to open the first cross-border bus service. It will make Tajikistan the fifth country to have crossborder exit and entry transport with the autonomous region, together with Pakistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The operation of the bus line will go a long way in linking Xinjiang and other parts of China with Central Asian countries

The southern tip of Xinjiang is far away (4,500 kms) to the eastern coast of China whereas it is only 2,500 kms from Gwadar port in Balochistan. From another point of view, the development of Gwadar seaport simultaneously reflects the China's policy of appeasement toward Xingjiang's masses and that of containment against the separatists in that region.

Proximity of Xinjiang to Gwadar also makes it feasible and cost-effective for China to carry out trade through this port which is close to the Gulf, Central Asia,

Europe and Africa.

China wants to con-

vert its western

region into a hub of

economic and com-

mercial activities.

seaboard ports are

3,500 kilometers away

from Kashgar, west

ern China's main city

whereas the distance

from Kashgar to the

Pakistani coasta

town of Gwadar or

Balochistan coast

is only 1,500 kilome

ters. Given this fact

there is an obviou

huge cost advantage

eastern

China's

Gwadar is strategically located on the western end of Balochistan coast, on the opposite end of the Gulf of Oman and the Straits of Hormuz and on the mouth of the Gulf. It lies just 624 nautical kms to the east of Straits of Hormuz, which is an important route for oil tankers bound for Japan and western countries out of the Gulf. When the deep-sea port becomes functional, vaious plans for important cross-national oil pipelines passing through the province would further enhance the region's strategic value. Chinese financial assistance and technical expertise would be instrumental throughout the course of development of the port.

> policy toward Xingjiang, to open up and put the troubled region on a fast track development in order to bring to an end current frustration and a sense of deprivation and alienation among Uighur Muslims.

The Xinjiang autonomous region, a Muslim majority province, is located in the northwest of the country, covering an area of 1.6 million square kilometers, and having a population of 18.46 million. It is one of the least developed regions in western China. At present, the Chinese authorities are taking various measures to suppress and control the extremist elements in Xingjiang to speed up the development process. In the crackdowns launched during the past tenyears, the security agencies have detained a large number of people for planning and engineering terrorist acts and subversive activities in the region.

China launched its new economic plan aimed at rapid development of its western province in 2002 consisting of 50 new projects. The plan also included a package of incentives for foreign investors. China will reportedly spend \$90 billion for speedy development of its western regions in next 10 to 15 years

About \$200 billion had already been

for China to use Gwadar as the gateway port for its western region.

China is likely to finance a highway-lin from Gwadar to the central Balochista town of Khuzdar, on the RCD Highway con necting Karachi and Quetta.

Similarly, the upgrading of the existin road-link connecting Quetta to the Indu Highway via Loralai and Dera Ghazi Khar is under consideration of Islamabad an Beijing.

Under a memorandum of understandin (MOU) signed by the two countries, Chin will build a 90-kilometre highway-link cor necting the Chinese side of the Karakorar Highway to the Russian-built highway ne work that already connects all the fiv Central Asian Republics (CARs). Thi regional highway network will directly b linking Gwadar to Xingjiang and the land locked CARs.

Since outflow of goods from wester China and Central Asia reaching Gwada will pass through this overland trade route Pakistan could earn millions of dollars year in terms of port and cargo-handlin charges and also as freight charges fo import cargoes and export goods of th CARs and western China to/from Gwadar fo shipment to world markets.